Protocol++® (Protocolpp®)  v5.6.2
jecdsaf2msa Class Reference

#include "include/jecdsaf2msa.h"

Detailed Description

Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm Security Association (ECF2MDSASA) for F2M

see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_Digital_Signature_Algorithm

In cryptography, the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) offers a variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) which uses elliptic curve cryptography

Key and signature-size comparison to DSA

As with elliptic-curve cryptography in general, the bit size of the public key believed to be needed for ECDSA is about twice the size of the security level, in bits. For example, at a security level of 80 bits (meaning an attacker requires a maximum of about $ {2}^{80} $ operations to find the private key) the size of an ECDSA public key would be 160 bits, whereas the size of a DSA public key is at least 1024 bits. On the other hand, the signature size is the same for both DSA and ECDSA: approximately $ 4t$ bits, where $ t$ is the security level measured in bits, that is, about 320 bits for a security level of 80 bits

Signature generation algorithm

Suppose Alice wants to send a signed message to Bob. Initially, they must agree on the curve parameters ( CURVE , G , n ). In addition to the field and equation of the curve, we need G, a base point of prime order on the curve; n is the multiplicative order of the point G

ECDSA Parameters
ParameterDescription
CURVEthe elliptic curve field and equation used
Gelliptic curve base point, such as a pt $(x_0,y_0)$ on $ {y}^{2} = {x}^{3} + 7$, a generator of the elliptic curve with large prime order n
ninteger order of $ G$, means that $ n \times G = O$, where O is the identity element

The order n of the base point G must be prime. Indeed, we assume that every nonzero element of the ring $ \frac{Z}{nZ}$ are invertible, so that $ \frac{Z}{nZ}$ must be a field. It implies that n must be prime (cf. Bézout's identity)

Alice creates a key pair, consisting of a private key integer $ d_A$, randomly selected in the interval $ [ 1 , n - 1 ]$; and a public key curve point $ Q_A = d_A \times G$

We use $ \times$ to denote elliptic curve point multiplication by a scalar

For Alice to sign a message m, she follows these steps:

  • Calculate $ e = HASH(m)$, where $ HASH$ is a cryptographic hash function, such as SHA-2
  • Let $ z$ be the $ L_n$ leftmost bits of $ e$, where $ L_n$ is the bit length of the group order $ n$
  • Select a cryptographically secure random integer k from $ [1 , n - 1]$
  • Calculate the curve point $ (x_1, y_1) = k \times G$
  • Calculate $ r = x_1 mod n$. If $ r = 0$, go back to step 3
  • Calculate $ s = {k}^{-1} ( z + rd_A ) mod n $
  • If $ s = 0$, go back to step 3
  • The signature is the pair $ (r, s)$

When computing $ s$, the string $ z$ resulting from $ HASH(m)$ shall be converted to an integer. Note that $ z$ can be greater than $ n$ but not longer

As the standard notes, it is not only required for k to be secret, but it is also crucial to select different k for different signatures, otherwise the equation in step 6 can be solved for $ d_A$, the private key: Given two signatures $ (r,s)$ and $ (r, {s}^{'})$, employing the same unknown $ k$ for different known messages $ m$ and $ {m}^{'}$, an attacker can calculate $ z$ and $ {z}^{'}$, and since $ s - {s}^{'} = {k}^{-1}(z - {z}^{'})$ (all operations in this paragraph are done modulo n ) the attacker can find $ k = \frac{z - {z}^{'}}{s - {s}^{'}}$. Since $ s = {k}^{-1}(z + rd_A)$, the attacker can now calculate the private key $ d_A = \frac{sk - z}{r}$.

Another way ECDSA signature may leak private keys is when k is generated by a faulty random number generator. To ensure that k is unique for each message one may bypass random number generation completely and generate deterministic signatures by deriving k from both the message and the private key

Signature verification algorithm

For Bob to authenticate Alice's signature, he must have a copy of her public-key curve point $ Q_A$

Bob can verify $ Q_A$ is a valid curve point as follows:

  • Check that $ Q_A$ is not equal to the identity element $ O$, and its coordinates are otherwise valid
  • Check that $ Q_A$ lies on the curve
  • Check that $ n \times Q_A = O$

After that, Bob follows these steps:

  • Verify that $ r$ and $ s$ are integers in $ [1, n - 1]$. If not, the signature is invalid.
  • Calculate $ e = HASH (m)$, where $ HASH$ is the same function used in the signature generation
  • Let $ z$ be the $ L_n$ leftmost bits of $ e$
  • Calculate $ w = {s}^{-1} mod n$
  • Calculate $ u_1 = zw mod n and u_2 = rw mod n$
  • Calculate the curve point $ (x_1, y_1) = u_1 \times G + u_2 \times Q_A$
  • If $ (x_1, y_1) = O$ then the signature is invalid
  • The signature is valid if $ r \equiv x_1 ( mod n )$, invalid otherwise

Note that using Shamir's trick, a sum of two scalar multiplications $ u_1 \times G + u_2 \times Q_A$ can be calculated faster than two scalar multiplications done independently

Concerns

There exist two sorts of concerns with ECDSA:

  • Political concerns: the trustworthiness of NIST-produced curves being questioned after revelations that the NSA willingly inserts backdoors into software, hardware components and published standards were made; well-known cryptographers have expressed doubts about how the NIST curves were designed, and voluntary tainting has already been proved in the past
  • Technical concerns: the difficulty of properly implementing the standard, its slowness, and design flaws which reduce security in insufficiently defensive implementations of the Dual EC DRBG random number generator

For API information:

See also
ProtocolPP::jsecass
ProtocolPP::jecdsaf2msa
ProtocolPP::jecdsaf2m
ProtocolPP::jprotocol
ProtocolPP::jprotocolpp
ProtocolPP::jenum

For Additional Documentation:

See also
jsecass
jecdsaf2msa
jecdsaf2m
jprotocol
jprotocolpp
jenum
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The documentation for this class was generated from the following file: